Identity, Instrumental Self-Interest and Institutional Evaluations: Explaining Public Opinion on Common European Policies in Foreign Affairs and Defence by Schoen, Harald
www.ssoar.info
Identity, Instrumental Self-Interest and Institutional
Evaluations: Explaining Public Opinion on Common
European Policies in Foreign Affairs and Defence
Schoen, Harald
Postprint / Postprint
Zeitschriftenartikel / journal article
Zur Verfügung gestellt in Kooperation mit / provided in cooperation with:
www.peerproject.eu
Empfohlene Zitierung / Suggested Citation:
Schoen, H. (2008). Identity, Instrumental Self-Interest and Institutional Evaluations: Explaining Public Opinion
on Common European Policies in Foreign Affairs and Defence. European Union Politics, 9(1), 5-29. https://
doi.org/10.1177/1465116507085955
Nutzungsbedingungen:
Dieser Text wird unter dem "PEER Licence Agreement zur
Verfügung" gestellt. Nähere Auskünfte zum PEER-Projekt finden
Sie hier: http://www.peerproject.eu Gewährt wird ein nicht
exklusives, nicht übertragbares, persönliches und beschränktes
Recht auf Nutzung dieses Dokuments. Dieses Dokument
ist ausschließlich für den persönlichen, nicht-kommerziellen
Gebrauch bestimmt. Auf sämtlichen Kopien dieses Dokuments
müssen alle Urheberrechtshinweise und sonstigen Hinweise
auf gesetzlichen Schutz beibehalten werden. Sie dürfen dieses
Dokument nicht in irgendeiner Weise abändern, noch dürfen
Sie dieses Dokument für öffentliche oder kommerzielle Zwecke
vervielfältigen, öffentlich ausstellen, aufführen, vertreiben oder
anderweitig nutzen.
Mit der Verwendung dieses Dokuments erkennen Sie die
Nutzungsbedingungen an.
Terms of use:
This document is made available under the "PEER Licence
Agreement ". For more Information regarding the PEER-project
see: http://www.peerproject.eu This document is solely intended
for your personal, non-commercial use.All of the copies of
this documents must retain all copyright information and other
information regarding legal protection. You are not allowed to alter
this document in any way, to copy it for public or commercial
purposes, to exhibit the document in public, to perform, distribute
or otherwise use the document in public.
By using this particular document, you accept the above-stated
conditions of use.
Diese Version ist zitierbar unter / This version is citable under:
https://nbn-resolving.org/urn:nbn:de:0168-ssoar-229290
Identity, Instrumental 
Self-Interest and Institutional
Evaluations
Explaining Public Opinion on Common
European Policies in Foreign Affairs 
and Defence
Harald Schoen
Johannes Gutenberg University, Germany
A B S T R A C T
This paper addresses public opinion on common European
policies in foreign affairs and defence. It proposes three
models of support for common policies in these fields.
Drawing on Eurobarometer data, the analysis shows that
instrumental self-interest and territorial identities contribute
considerably to explaining support for common foreign
affairs and defence policies. Moreover, support for common
policies is strongly driven by domain-specific evaluations of
the European Union’s performance. These findings suggest
that popular support for common European policies in
foreign affairs and defence has an experiential base. Thus,
elites have an incentive to respond to public opinion when
making policy decisions, so this analysis supports the liberal
view in international relations rather than the realist account.
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Introduction
After early ambitious attempts to establish common European policies in
defence and foreign affairs failed, for a considerable period European inte-
gration in these domains advanced slowly, if at all. In the 1990s, however,
integration proceeded at a considerably higher rate. The Maastricht Treaty
established the Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP) as the second
pillar of the European Union. In more recent years, with the establishment of
a High Representative for the CFSP, decision-making was made more
efficient, troops were assigned to the European Union (EU) and the EU began
to engage in civilian and military crisis management (e.g. M. Smith, 2004).
The Constitutional Treaty goes even further as it includes creating the position
of a Foreign Affairs Minister of the EU, widening of the so-called ‘Petersberg
tasks’, a mutual defence clause and a terrorism-related solidarity clause.
Notwithstanding the Constitutional Treaty’s failure in 2005, European inte-
gration has advanced in foreign affairs and defence and is likely to progress
further in the future (e.g. Howorth, 2001; Ojanen, 2006).
Whereas political science has paid considerable attention to advances
toward common European policies in foreign affairs and defence (e.g. 
H. Smith, 2002; K. Smith, 2003; M. Smith, 2004), only a few studies deal with
public opinion. Lindberg and Scheingold (1970: 55–63) found that the per-
missive consensus among Europeans on European integration did not extend
to foreign affairs and defence. Several more recent studies reported trends of
public opinion on collective defence (Manigart and Marlier, 1993; Everts, 1995;
Sinnott, 1997; Everts and Sinnott, 2002). Prior analyses also explored the
location of foreign affairs and defence in the structure of citizens’ preferences
over EU policy (Sinnott, 2000; Gabel and Anderson, 2002; see, for party mani-
festoes, Gabel and Hix, 2002). Loveless and Rohrschneider (2006) showed that
attitudes towards current defence institutions have a bearing on EU support
in Eastern Europe. At the same time, only a few studies addressed the sources
of Europeans’ attitudes toward common foreign and security policy (e.g.
Rattinger, 1996). In this line of research, Carrubba and Singh (2004) showed
that Europeans have different goods in mind when thinking about a common
defence policy, whereas Ray and Johnston (2007) explored Europeans’
opinions about the EU’s role in European defence as compared with NATO.
In summary, though prior research has produced interesting results, we still
do not know much about the sources of public opinion on common European
policies in foreign affairs and defence.
Findings on these sources have considerable implications concerning the
image of public opinion and the role it can play in policy-making. According
to the traditional view (e.g. Lippmann, 1922; Almond, 1950), voters are not
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well acquainted with policies as remote to daily life as defence and foreign
affairs and they do not form genuine attitudes or give indifferent answers in
surveys (Converse, 1964). As a result, public opinion is fickle and cannot serve
as a reliable guide for policy-making (e.g. Slater, 1983). Moreover, because
citizens do not follow events closely, they are not able to review elite behav-
iour in these policy domains. Consequently, political elites have no incentive
to respond to public opinion in foreign affairs and defence, so that public
preferences in this field do not matter for elite decision-making. However,
this view, which is in line with realist accounts of international relations
(Waltz, 1967: 14; Morgenthau, 1978: 558), has been challenged in recent
decades. Revisionists put forward evidence suggesting that public opinion on
foreign policy is not as ill informed and volatile as traditional accounts claim.
Accordingly, public opinion on defence and foreign affairs possesses struc-
ture and responds reasonably to foreign policy events (e.g. Peffley and
Hurwitz, 1992; Shapiro and Page, 1988; Isernia et al., 2002). Thus, elites have
an incentive to respond to public preferences in this field. Indeed scholars
have shown that public opinion plays a role in constraining elites’ decisions
on foreign policy and European integration (e.g. Carrubba, 2001; Sobel, 2001;
Jacobs and Page, 2005). All in all, these findings back liberal strands of thought
in international relations (e.g. Wendt, 1992).
Against this backdrop, this paper aims to shed light on the sources of
European public opinion on common foreign and security policy. It starts by
discussing competing models of support for common European policies in
the foreign and defence domain. Drawing on Eurobarometer data, it examines
the explanatory power of the three models. The paper concludes by
discussing the findings and elaborating on some implications.
Theorizing support for common foreign and 
defence policies
Prior research has rarely addressed citizens’ attitudes toward common
European foreign and defence policies. This analysis thus cannot adopt a
tailor-made model of support for common European policies in this area.
However, establishing common policies clearly implies advancing European
integration, and citizens’ attitudes toward common defence and foreign
policy appear to be related to general preferences on European policy (Gabel
and Anderson, 2002). Therefore, factors that previous research has shown to
shape citizens’ attitudes toward European integration should go a consider-
able way toward explaining support for or opposition to common policies 
in defence and foreign affairs. As a consequence, this analysis starts by
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outlining three models of support for European integration that are presumed
to be applicable to explaining levels of support.
Utilitarian models of support for European integration build on the
assumption that calculations of costs and benefits drive attitudes toward the
European Union. Accordingly, these models of EU support claim that citizens
rely on egocentric or sociotropic assessments of the (putative) consequences
of European integration when forming opinions about it (e.g. Gabel, 1998a, b).
Previous studies showed that economic evaluations play a role in shaping
attitudes toward European integration, which for a long time chiefly dealt
with economics (e.g. Eichenberg and Dalton, 1993; Anderson, 1998; Gabel,
1998b, c; Hooghe and Marks, 2005). As regards public attitudes toward
foreign affairs and defence policy, putative consequences for the economic
well-being of Europeans are presumably less influential than utilitarian
evaluations of effects on other goods such as national security (see Carrubba
and Singh, 2004).
National security benefits from common European policies depend on
several factors. For one thing, nations with military capabilities to protect
national security will benefit less from common policies than countries
possessing small military forces. For another thing, nations actually facing
threats to national security will benefit comparatively more from European
integration in this domain (Carrubba and Singh, 2004; see Hutchison and
Gibler, 2007). Accordingly, support for common foreign and defence policies
should be increased by (perceived) threats to national security and it should
be decreased by existing military capabilities.
The performance model builds on the presumption that evaluations of
how the EU institutions perform have a bearing on support for European inte-
gration and common policies. For instance, Rohrschneider (2002) shows that
concerns about the democratic process at the EU level decrease EU support
considerably. Likewise, Karp et al. (2003) find that concerns about the EU’s
ability to be responsive to citizen demands and a lack of confidence in the
EU institutions increase dissatisfaction with the European Union. Concerns
about the EU’s current institutional performance also have been shown to
affect public support for EU enlargement (Karp and Bowler, 2006). In this
view, citizens consider the EU institutions’ performance in managing current
affairs and rely on these evaluations when forming attitudes toward the EU
and specific EU policies. The performance model thus predicts that favour-
able evaluations of the performance of EU institutions increase support for
common policies in defence and foreign affairs.
Citizens’ evaluations of the EU’s performance can be general or domain
specific. General evaluations are likely to affect attitudes toward European
integration regardless of the policy domain. By contrast, domain-specific
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appraisals respond to policy content. Evaluations of the EU’s economic
performance, for example, should exhibit large effects on attitudes toward
further economic integration, whereas their effects on opinions about
European foreign and defence policy should be minimal. Following this line
of reasoning, support for common foreign and defence policies should be
increased by favourable evaluations of the EU institutions’ performance. This
model also predicts that satisfaction with the EU’s performance in this policy
area exhibits particularly strong effects on popular attitudes toward European
integration in foreign affairs and defence.
An influential strand of thought deals with territorial identities as factors
influencing attitudes toward European integration. Identity is a complex and
multidimensional concept (e.g. Risse and Engelmann-Martin, 2002). At the
individual level, it is warranted to distinguish two dimensions. Whereas 
the intensity dimension captures the strength of the loyalty felt by an indi-
vidual, the content dimension refers to the meaning of the group to an
individual member, including goals, norms, interests and cognitive models
(e.g. Abdelal et al., 2006).1 Identifying with a collective is powerful in shaping
political perception, attitudes toward political objects and political behaviour
(e.g. Sniderman et al., 2004). More specifically, attitudes toward European
integration have been found to be affected by territorial identities (e.g. Carey,
2002; Hooghe and Marks, 2005).2
Following this line of reasoning, identifying with Europe should affect
support for common foreign and defence policies, with the effect of strong
European attachments depending on the subjective meaning of Europe.
European identifiers believing in the idea of a European free-trade zone are
not particularly likely to back a common foreign and defence policy. By
contrast, citizens subscribing to the notion of Europe as a unitary actor in
international politics will endorse integration in foreign affairs and defence.
At the same time, given a specific content, the effect of European identity
should increase with the intensity of European attachments. Still, there is
another possibility. Because the EU appears to have achieved hegemony in
the civic dimension of European identity (e.g. Bruter, 2003), identifying with
Europe might imply agreeing on the goal of forming a unitary European actor.
If European identifiers take this meaning of Europe for granted, strong
European loyalties in themselves will increase support for transferring
authority in the foreign and defence domain to the EU.
As with European attachments, the effect of strong national attachments
on support for common European foreign and defence policy is conditioned
by the meaning of the nation to its members. Previous research has demon-
strated that a wide variety of conceptions of national identity exists (e.g.
Marcussen et al., 1999). As regards creating a common foreign and defence
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policy, those components of national identity that refer to statehood and the
nation’s role in international relations are particularly salient. The principle
of neutrality in international affairs is a case in point (e.g. Kovács and Wodak,
2003). Because a common European foreign and defence policy might lead to
involvement in international conflict, citizens whose notion of national
identity encompasses the principle of neutrality should refuse the creation of
a common foreign and defence policy. Moreover, pooling authority at the
European level implies curtailing national governments’ ability to pursue
distinct courses of action. Citizens subscribing to the principles of national
sovereignty, national self-determination and non-interference in internal
affairs thus should be particularly sceptical about transferring sovereign
rights to supranational institutions. As with European identity, these effects
should increase with the intensity of national attachments. Because national
identities in Europe are closely linked to the idea of the nation state (e.g.
Bloom, 1990), national identifiers may quite naturally subscribe to the notion
of national sovereignty and self-determination. If this presumption holds, the
intensity of national attachments by itself should decrease support for
common policies.
Though seemingly paradoxical, a common foreign and defence policy
could also be thought of as empowering, rather than weakening, the nation-
state in maintaining self-determination and sovereignty (see Risse, 2003). In
this vein, a common European foreign and defence policy might be a means
for the nation-state to deal with external threats. As a consequence, the effect
on support for European integration in foreign affairs and defence of national
identity focusing on statehood and self-determination should be conditioned
by the occurrence of external threats. Given external threats, attachments to
the nation-state should be less effective in decreasing support for common
foreign and defence policy.
The three models of popular support differ considerably in their impli-
cations for the image of public opinion about common European foreign and
defence policies. According to the identity model, citizens ask whether
European integration in this domain is in line with their notion of national
or European identity, including goals, norms and values. Since identities are
incorporated in institutions, symbols and cultural understandings (e.g. Oakes
et al., 1994; Risse, 2003), they are, although potentially variable, quite stable
over time. As a result, this model suggests that attitudes toward European
integration in foreign affairs and defence are also not volatile. The utilitarian
model suggests that citizens consider the putative consequences of policy
decisions when forming attitudes toward the CFSP. Thus, they are assumed
to be prospective instrumental voters. The performance model, in contrast,
maintains that public attitudes toward European integration in foreign affairs
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and defence are driven by evaluations of the EU’s general or domain-specific
performance. For instance, citizens form evaluations of whether political elites
act in accordance with public preferences on common defence and foreign
policies and rely on these assessments when making up their mind about
further integration in this field. Accordingly, citizens are retrospective voters
and public support has an experiential base. Thus, if the performance model
applies, political elites have a strong incentive to respond to public opinion
on foreign affairs and defence. However, the validity of this model does not
guarantee policy responsiveness because elites might disregard or mis-
perceive public opinion (e.g. Powlick, 1991; Kull and Ramsay, 2000).3
Data, measures and methods
The data for my analysis come from the Eurobarometer 62, a survey among
Europeans conducted on behalf of the European Commission in November
and December 2004. Respondents were randomly selected using sample
points, random routes and Kish selection grids and were interviewed person-
ally, using Computer Aided Personal Interviewing (CAPI) if available.
Attitudes toward common foreign and defence policy are measured by
six variables. Two items address support for one common foreign policy and
for one common defence and security policy at a rather general level. The
remaining items tap more specific issues. To begin with, respondents were
asked whether the EU should have its own Foreign Minister as proposed in
the Constitutional Treaty (Article I-28). Another item taps the idea that the
European Union should have its own seat on the United Nations Security
Council, which had been proposed by pundits and several European
politicians such as Commissioner for External Affairs Benita Ferrero-Waldner
(e.g. Sylvester, 2004; Stelzenmüller, 2005). Whereas these two items refer to
institutional issues, the remaining items concern the EU’s handling of inter-
national crises. The first question concerns whether member states of the
European Union should agree on a common position when an international
crisis occurs. The second item concerns a European military rapid response
force to be deployed when an international crisis occurs, which the EU
proposed for the first time in the wake of the Kosovo crisis in 1999 (e.g. 
M. Smith, 2004: 233).
Single-item measures are problematic for several reasons. I thus explored
whether the six items could be combined into one or two factors. Factor
analysis suggests that the two general items form one factor, as do the four
specific items. Because the results of the substantive analysis vary consider-
ably across items, however, I report the results for the two factors in the
Schoen Identity, Instrumental Self-Interest and Institutional Evaluations 1 1
appendix4 and chiefly deal with the six single items in the remainder of this
paper.
To examine how well the three models perform in explaining support for
these six proposals, I run logistic regression models. The utilitarian model
predicts that support for the CFSP depends on threats to national security
and existing capabilities to protect national security. To test this model, I
include a dummy variable that equals 1 for countries that have experienced
military interference in internal affairs since World War II (threat). I expect a
positive effect of threat on support for the CFSP. At the same time, I antici-
pate respondents living in countries possessing nuclear weapons to be less
supportive of the CFSP (nuclear weapons) because these military capabilities
reduce the benefit from a common European foreign and defence policy.5
These and other variables in my analysis are detailed in the appendix.
As regards the performance model, I include evaluations of the perform-
ance of EU institutions and satisfaction with democracy at the EU level (EU
institutions, EU democracy). To explore the predictive power of domain-specific
assessments, I include evaluations of the role the European Union plays in
defence and foreign affairs in the respondent’s country (EU defence, EU foreign
policy). Moreover, favourable evaluations of the EU’s role in global matters
such as peace in the world, the fight against terrorism and protection of the
environment should increase support for common European policies in the
foreign and defence domain (EU global affairs). Finally, the analysis includes
evaluations of the impact of EU membership on personal security (security).
These variables are plagued with endogeneity problems because evaluations
of EU performance are likely to be affected by generalized preferences over
transferring authority to the supranational level. To deal with this problem,
I use the residuals resulting from regressions of the original variables on the
general preference for creating a European political union and for more EU
competencies. Using ‘purged’ measures leads to conservative estimates that
capture the effect of performance evaluations presumably more adequately
than analyses using original variables.
Because the Eurobarometer data are rather ill suited to represent multi-
dimensional territorial identities, the analysis chiefly employs second-best
indicators. One captures how strongly the respondent feels attached to her
nation (national attachment) and another one covers the strength of her
European attachment (European attachment). Turning to the content of national
identity, one indicator captures whether the respondent exclusively identifies
with her nation, indicating a strong attachment to the ideas of statehood and
national sovereignty (exclusively national identity). Because these measures of
the intensity and the content dimension suffer from similar problems to the
indicators discussed in the previous paragraph, they were purged using the
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procedure described above. Another dummy variable measures whether a
respondent lives in a neutral country (neutrality). To test whether the effects
of content of national identity are conditioned by the intensity of national
attachments, I also created two multiplicative terms (national attachment 
neutrality; national attachment  exclusively national identity). The substantive
dimension of European identity is captured by a dummy variable that equals
1 for inhabitants of the original six EC member states (original six), thereby
assuming that these respondents are particularly likely to subscribe to the
notion of Europe as a unified actor. As with national identities, I multiply the
content dimension by the intensity dimension of European identity to explore
interaction effects (European attachment  political union). Finally, to test
whether the effect of the belief in national sovereignty responds to territorial
threats both variables are multiplied (exclusively national identity  threat).
In addition to these variables I include several controls. Along with age
and gender I employ formal education. Moreover, because left–right ideology
has been shown to affect attitudes toward European integration and foreign
policy, with people at the right-hand end of the ideological spectrum being
sceptical about European integration (e.g. McLaren, 2002) and disproportion-
ately favourable to the use of military force (e.g. Juhasz, 2001; Holsti, 2004:
191–6), I include a relevant variable.
The survey data were gathered from individuals living in 25 countries
and are thus multi-level data. Using conventional methods of estimation
would increase the probability of significance tests passing conventional
levels. To deal with this problem, I estimate models using robust standard
errors clustered by country. This method leads to more consistent standard
errors even when some assumptions concerning variance are not valid.
As in previous studies of public opinion using Eurobarometer data,
missing values are a considerable problem in this analysis.6 By and large,
prior research has chosen one of two avenues to deal with missing values
(e.g. Allison, 2002). In several studies, item non-response is treated using a
listwise deletion option. Though often leading to acceptable results, in this
analysis it is not applicable because in the data set on which my analysis
draws item non-response cumulatively results in a tremendous reduction in
cases. Another strategy replaces missing values by some reasonable guesses.
For example, missing values on dichotomous variables are substituted by the
mean of the variable’s two values or by the mean for those respondents with
valid values on the variable of interest. This strategy results in biased results
(e.g. Little, 1992), so it is not employed. Rather, to deal with the non-response
problem, this analysis employs multiple imputation; i.e. missing values are
replaced with substitutes that are not set by the researcher but are estimated
based on the distribution of the given data using an iterative procedure. To
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do this I use MICE (‘multiple imputation by chained equations’) (Van Buuren
et al., 1999) as implemented in Stata (Royston, 2004, 2005).7
Results
As the results in Table 1 indicate, by and large European citizens strongly
approve of common policies in foreign affairs and defence. Roughly 84%
support pursuing a common defence and security policy, and 77% agree that
EU member countries should pursue one common foreign policy. Turning
from general aims to more specific policies with institutional implications,
about 82% support the idea of the EU possessing a seat on the United Nations
Security Council, though this notion is not very popular with political elites.
At the same time, 77% support the proposal to create an EU foreign minister,
implying that a strong majority of European citizens regrets the failure of the
Constitution when it comes to this policy proposal. As regards the handling
of international crises, EU citizens endorse common action. Nine out of ten
respondents support the proposal that member states should agree on a
common position in international crises. However, EU citizens are somewhat
less supportive of the idea of forming a rapid military reaction force to be
deployed when an international crisis occurs. This difference might indicate
that some Europeans subscribe to the idea of common reactions to inter-
national crises but do not want to use military force when a crisis occurs.
In sum, the six items are supported by large majorities of the European
public. Thus, these descriptive results affirm prior research showing that there
is considerable support for policy measures that make the EU a stronger actor
in foreign affairs and defence (see e.g. Everts and Sinnott, 2002). By the same
token, by being reluctant to advance European integration in foreign affairs
and defence as well as in other fields such as economic regulation, political
elites appear to be at odds with European public opinion. However, looking
at the marginal distributions of popular preferences does not tell us whether
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Table 1 Support for common European policies in foreign affairs and defence
Common Common Seat on Rapid 
foreign defence UN Foreign Crisis military 
policy policy Council minister management force
Support (%) 77 84 82 77 90 78
Note: N = 24,770.
political elites have an incentive to respond to public opinion on European
policies in foreign affairs and defence. To answer this question I now analyse
the sources of support for policies in this domain.
Tables 2 and 3 report the results of logistic regressions of support for
common European policies in the foreign affairs and defence domain. To
examine the effects of the predictor variables in more detail, I also calculate,
predicted probabilities of supporting policy proposals from the models
reported in Table 2, while setting all other variables to their mode, median
and mean, respectively. Table 4 reports the differences in the probability of
supporting the policy proposals at the high end and at the low end of the
independent variables or, for non-dichotomous predictors, two standard
deviations above and below the mean.
As the low values for pseudo-R2 in Tables 2 and 3 indicate, the variables
included in the models explain only a small to moderate portion of the
variation in Europeans’ attitudes toward EU foreign and defence policies.8 In
light of the rather low variance in the dependent variables and the ‘purging’
of independent variables, this finding comes as no surprise. Moreover, the
independent variables are somewhat better in explaining opinions on the
rather general issues of establishing common defence and foreign policies
than attitudes toward more specific proposals. Interestingly, results for
policies pursued by the EU, e.g. the rapid military reaction force, do not differ
substantially from those for proposals that EU institutions do not officially
support, e.g. an EU seat on the UN Security Council.
Utilitarian considerations play a considerable role in influencing attitudes
toward European integration in this domain. In line with my expectations,
being a citizen of a nation possessing nuclear weapons decreases support for
a common foreign policy and a common defence policy. According to the
results in Table 4, the effects are quite sizeable. In particular, respondents
inhabiting countries with nuclear weapons are, ceteris paribus, by roughly 16
points more likely to approve of a common foreign policy than are other
respondents. When it comes to more specific policy proposals, however, the
effects are considerably smaller. Surprisingly, nuclear weapons increase,
rather than decrease, support for creating a rapid military force. This finding
suggests that citizens of nuclear powers deem a European rapid military force
a suitable supplement to their nation’s capabilities of pursuing the national
interest.
The results also show that threats to national security are conducive to
support for European integration in foreign affairs and defence. However, the
effects vary considerably across policy proposals. External threats consider-
ably increase support for a common defence policy, coordinated policies in
international crises and a rapid military force. By contrast, they do not affect
Schoen Identity, Instrumental Self-Interest and Institutional Evaluations 1 5
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attitudes toward the three proposals relating to diplomacy rather than to the
use of force. Accordingly, EU citizens appear to respond to issue content when
forming attitudes toward European integration in foreign affairs and defence.
National identity plays a considerable role in shaping attitudes toward
common foreign and defence policies at the EU level. EU citizens subscrib-
ing to the notion of national sovereignty, self-determination and non-
interference in internal affairs are particularly hesitant about supporting a
common foreign policy, a common defence policy and creating the position
of an EU foreign minister. At the same time, the effect of this notion of the
nation-state is only weakly conditioned by the intensity of national attach-
ments, if at all (Table 3). Only the effect on support for a rapid military force
gets stronger when moving from weak to strong national attachments. As a
result, only among strong national identifiers does endorsing the principle 
of national self-determination decrease support for a rapid military force 
(b = –0.10; p = .006).
In contrast, the effect of a strict notion of national sovereignty and
national self-determination on support for common European policies is
considerably conditioned by external threats. According to the results in
Table 3, in the absence of external threats EU citizens subscribing to the prin-
ciple of national self-determination are particularly likely to reject inte-
gration in the foreign and defence domain. Given external threats, however,
support for this norm does not affect attitudes toward European integration
in foreign affairs and defence policy. This finding suggests that external
threats make EU citizens more inclined to consider the common foreign and
defence policy not only as a challenge to national sovereignty but also as a
means to maintain it.
The analysis also reveals that subscribing to the norm of neutrality
decreases support for common foreign and defence policy. As Table 4 shows,
citizens of neutral countries are less likely, by about 18 points, to endorse a
common defence policy than are other respondents. This finding is in line
with the assumption that neutrality renders citizens particularly sceptical
about involvement in military conflicts. Neutrality also plays a sizeable
negative role in support for a common foreign policy and a European foreign
minister. At the same time, it does not affect attitudes toward a rapid military
force that could be sent to trouble-spots.
The results reported in Table 3 show that the effect of subscribing to
neutrality is scarcely conditioned by the intensity of national attachments. The
statistically significant coefficient for the interaction term in the analysis of
support for a rapid military force hardly alters this conclusion because the
effect of neutrality is indistinguishable from 0 irrespective of whether national
attachments are very weak or strong. The intensity of national loyalties also
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leaves support for European integration in this policy domain unaffected, as
indicated by the statistically insignificant coefficients in Table 2. As a result,
the analysis suggests that the content dimension of national identity is much
more influential than the intensity dimension in shaping public support for
European integration in foreign affairs and defence.
Similarly, European attachments are quite ineffective in shaping public
attitudes toward European integration in this policy domain. Intense
European loyalties considerably increase support only for a common foreign
policy. As regards creating a rapid military force and, albeit less clearly,
common reactions in international crises, European attachments even tend to
decrease support. This result suggests that for some EU citizens the meaning
of Europe encompasses the concept of a civilian power. At the same time,
respondents subscribing to the idea that Europe should become a unitary
actor in international politics are particularly likely to support common
policies in foreign affairs and defence policy. As the results in Table 2 show,
this effect is quite strong on attitudes toward the two general issues and the
question of commonly managing an international crisis. Except for attitudes
toward a common foreign policy, however, the effect of this substantive
component of European identity is virtually unconditioned by the intensity
of European loyalties (Table 3).
Europeans rely on evaluations of the existing European institutions when
assessing proposals referring to European defence and foreign policy. They
do not indiscriminately draw on retrospective assessments, however. Rather,
general evaluations of institutional performance are considerably less effec-
tive in shaping attitudes toward common policies than are domain-specific
assessments. The results reported in Table 2 show that satisfaction with EU
democracy rarely affects attitudes toward common policies. Likewise, general
performance evaluations are not powerful predictors of public support for
European integration in this area.
Domain-specific evaluations of the EU are much more powerful in
shaping public opinion on European policies in foreign affairs and defence.
Favourable evaluations of the effects of EU membership on personal security
considerably increase support for common policies. For example, respondents
believing that EU membership contributes to their personal security are over
10 points more likely to endorse a common foreign policy and a European
foreign minister than are persons not holding this belief. Assessments of the
EU’s impact on national defence policy affect support for pursuing one
common defence policy, the rapid military force issue and, albeit less strongly,
a common foreign policy, but they do not exhibit an effect on the remaining
three proposals. As the predicted probabilities reported in Table 4 show, the
effects of the defence-related assessments are quite sizeable: a positive opinion
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about the EU’s role regarding the national defence policy increases support
for the rapid military force and one common security and defence policy by
roughly 8 and 12 points, respectively. Likewise, evaluations of the EU’s impact
on national foreign policy exhibit effects on attitudes toward common
European policies. As with retrospective defence evaluations, the effects of
foreign policy assessments, albeit to a smaller extent, vary across policy
proposals. In particular, they are more limited on support for a rapid military
force than attitudes toward other issues such as a common foreign policy or
commonly managing international crises. This pattern suggests that EU
citizens respond to issue content when forming attitudes toward European
integration in defence policy and foreign affairs.
Attitudes toward the EU’s performance in global affairs consistently
influence support for common European policies. As the results reported in
Table 4 show, these effects are quite substantial. For example, a person with
a good opinion about the role the EU plays in managing global problems is
more likely by roughly 10 points to support a rapid military force, a common
foreign policy, commonly managing international crises and an EU seat on
the UN Security Council than a person who criticizes the EU’s performance
in global affairs. According to this pattern, these retrospective assessments
appear to be particularly influential in affecting attitudes toward issues
referring to the EU’s role in world politics.9
The control variables play a minor role in directly shaping attitudes
toward foreign and defence policy at the EU level. Gender affects only
support for establishing an EU seat on the UN Council, with women being
somewhat more inclined to endorse this proposal. With increasing age,
support for the rapid military force declines somewhat. Education exhibits
its largest effect on support for the rapid military force, with those at the low
end of the educational ladder being most supportive of this measure. By and
large, left–right ideology is not very effective in affecting attitudes toward
European foreign and defence policy. However, moving to the right on the
left–right dimension increases the likelihood of supporting the European
rapid military force while decreasing support for a common defence policy
and a European foreign minister. This finding is in line with prior research
showing that a rightist view renders a person more likely to endorse the use
of military force and to reject the transfer of sovereign rights to the supra-
national level (e.g. Rattinger, 1996; Juhász, 2001).
Conclusion
This paper addresses public opinion on common European policies in foreign
affairs and defence. It shows that Europeans are generally very supportive of
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common European policies in these domains. Thus, political elites are
somewhat at odds with public opinion, because in foreign affairs and defence
EU member states are reluctant to cooperate or even to transfer authority to
the supranational level. Showing that elite actions are not in line with public
opinion does not imply that elites have an incentive to respond to popular
preferences, however. As the traditional view of public opinion on foreign
affairs and defence suggests, voters are not well acquainted with these policy
domains so that they do not perceive elite behaviour and cannot review
whether policy-making is in line with their policy preferences. To examine
whether elites have an incentive for policy responsiveness, this paper studies
the factors shaping support for common European policies in foreign affairs
and defence. The findings suggest that utilitarian evaluations play a consider-
able role in influencing attitudes toward common European policies. National
military capabilities decrease support for common European policies whereas
external threats make EU citizens more inclined to endorse integration in this
domain. National and European identities also affect these attitudes, with the
content dimension being considerably more influential than the intensity
dimension. For instance, citizens subscribing to the principles of neutrality
and national self-determination are quite sceptical about common policies,
whereas endorsing the notion of Europe as a unitary actor in international
politics increases support for further integration in foreign affairs and defence
policy. Accordingly, to some extent EU citizens ask whether European inte-
gration in this policy domain is in line with norms and values when forming
attitudes toward it. Whereas general assessments of how EU institutions
perform play a minor role, evaluations of the EU’s performance in foreign
affairs and defence are powerful in shaping support for common European
policies in these policy domains. Thus, it appears that EU citizens form policy-
specific evaluations of the EU’s performance that in turn shape support for
common European policies. As a result, citizens are able to examine whether
elites act in accordance with popular policy preferences and to rely on these
evaluations when forming attitudes toward common European policies. This
analysis thus suggests that elites have a considerable incentive to respond to
public opinion when making policy decisions.
It would be premature to conclude from this that elites are responsive to
popular preferences, however. To begin with, politicians who are inclined to
follow public opinion might misperceive the public’s preferences. Further-
more, they might not perceive any incentive to be responsive because they
might consider voters not to rely on evaluations of past performance when
forming attitudes. Moreover, despite perceiving public opinion and its
sources correctly, elites subscribing to the realist view of international
relations might refuse to take public opinion into account. The institutional
setting of the EU may also undermine the elites’ inclination to respond to
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public opinion in defence and foreign affairs. Compared with the national
political arena, for voters it is more difficult to hold EU politicians account-
able, so that the incentive for elite responsiveness might be too weak to be
effective. Finally, elites could prefer to overcome problems arising from public
opinion by strategically manipulating the information citizens rely on when
forming evaluations of how the European Union performs in foreign affairs
and defence. Regardless of these qualifications, however, this analysis shows
that there is an incentive for elites to be responsive (see also Carrubba, 2001),
thereby supporting the revisionist view of public opinion on these policy
domains rather than the traditional view.
This analysis also points to fertile areas of future research. In the absence
of better measures, it used many second-best indicators, notably single-item
measures. Scholars could overcome this shortcoming by gathering data that
are better suited to capture relevant concepts such as identity and perceived
threats. As the small to moderate proportions of variance explained indicate,
there is much room for additional factors to affect attitudes toward foreign
and defence policy at the EU level. It appears worthwhile to include elite
cues because elites interpret political events and thus play a crucial role in
influencing the way ordinary citizens, most of whom have no first-hand
experience of EU policies, perceive and evaluate elite behaviour. For
example, the predispositions voters rely on when forming attitudes toward
a specific policy may differ depending on public rhetoric. Future research on
public opinion on common European policies in defence and foreign affairs
could also benefit from adopting hierarchical models of attitude constraint.
By exploring how core values and general preferences shape attitudes
toward specific issues, scholars could shed light on the causal mechanisms
underlying public opinion on European integration in foreign affairs and
defence.
Notes
I am very grateful to the anonymous reviewers and the editor of this journal for
their very helpful comments and suggestions.
1 Accordingly, the utilitarian model is related to collective identities because
the criteria people rely on when evaluating the comparative utility of differ-
ent courses of action may be embedded in social identities.
2 The content of collective identities is not fixed and multifaceted, so that
persons identifying with a collective can differ in the understanding of it and
different components of identity can be given priority depending on the
context (e.g. Risse, 2003). Prior studies on European integration hardly
captured the complex nature of territorial identities. To be sure, several
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studies have argued that the content of national identity is variable and
subject to social construction, so that for some citizens national and European
identities are compatible whereas for others they are competing (e.g. Diez
Medrano and Guttiérez, 2001; Citrin and Sides, 2004). Many empirical
analyses of public opinion, however, have primarily dealt with the strength
of territorial attachments, thereby assuming the content of territorial
identities to be fixed.
3 Of course, the validity of this model is not a necessary condition for elites
being responsive to public opinion because elites may feel obliged to respond
to public opinion, regardless of its sources.
4 The results of the models with the two factors as dependent variables are
reported in the appendix, which is available at http://www.uni-konstanz.de/
eup/issues.htm.
5 NATO membership could be considered another indicator, with non-
members being more in need of additional military security (see Carrubba
and Singh, 2004). Leaving aside collinearity problems, NATO membership
reflects national identity at least partially, however, so that it is rather ill suited
to test the utilitarian model.
6 In this respect, the items on foreign and defence policy dealt with in this
present study differ only moderately, if at all, from items concerning other
issues that were used in prior studies.
7 The results of the models with imputed values do not differ substantively
from those of models without imputation (see the appendix).
8 Statistical tests confirmed that there were no serious collinearity problems.
9 Additional analyses show that this effect is particularly strong among respon-
dents who became EU citizens in 2004.
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